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ABSTRACT 
 There are two leading accounts of the principles of educational adequacy by Elizabeth 
Anderson and Debra Satz. Anderson’s and Satz’s accounts have been criticized for being 
insufficiently value-pluralist, and both lack a metric of justice. In this paper, I revise the principle 
of educational adequacy in order to address these problems. I argue that although the principle of 
educational adequacy cannot be the only principle in a complete theory of educational justice, it 
can tell us what basic justice in education requires in measurable terms. I highlight two core 
commitments that Anderson and Satz share: a commitment to 1) democratic egalitarianism and 
2) sufficientarian equal citizenship. Then, I reformulate these commitments in a way that 
accounts for the role that other egalitarian values have to play in a complete theory of justice in 
education. Finally, I claim that progress towards educational adequacy can be measured using 
the capabilities approach.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 Justice in education is an elusive notion. It is widely agreed upon that educational 
opportunities should be distributed according to principles of justice, but there is little agreement 
on which principles of justice are appropriate.1 One principle that should play a role in a complete 
theory of justice in education is the principle of educational adequacy. The principle of educational 
adequacy demands that every student have a sufficient education. There are two leading accounts 
of the principle of educational adequacy. One of these accounts is given by Elizabeth Anderson2 
and the other by Debra Satz.3 On both accounts, an education is only adequate if it prepares 
students for equal citizenship. Anderson focuses on the consequences of adopting a principle of 
educational adequacy for students likely to take up elite positions in society, and Satz focuses on 
the consequences for ordinary citizens. Anderson argues that adequacy requires that the school 
system should be arranged such that the elite is composed of people from all walks of life, and 
qualified to respond to and serve the needs of the worse-off in society. Satz argues that adequacy 
requires that all citizens achieve a set of competencies necessary for basic civil and political 
equality, and for obtaining a level of economic welfare sufficient for equal citizenship. 
 Although there is much to admire about Anderson’s and Satz’s views, they have at least 
two problems. First, they are insufficiently value-pluralist.4 In their arguments for educational 
adequacy, Anderson and Satz both criticize several interpretations of educational equality, and 
they suggest that the principle of adequacy is a better alternative to the principle of equality 
 
1 For an overview of theories of justice in education, see Liam Shields, Anne Newman and Debra Satz, “Equality of 
Educational Opportunity,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). 
2 Elizabeth Anderson, “Fair Opportunity in Education: A Democratic Equality Perspective,” Ethics 117 (July 2007): 
595-622. 
3 Debra Satz, “Equality, Adequacy, and Education for Citizenship,” Ethics 117 (July 2007): 623-648. 
4 See Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift. “Educational Equality versus Educational Adequacy: A Critique of Anderson 
and Satz.” Journal of Applied Philosophy 26, no. 2 (2009): 117-128. 
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outright. The principle of educational equality requires that all students have an equal education, 
and it admits of many interpretations. While theorists largely agree that no single interpretation of 
the principle of educational equality can yield a complete theory of justice in education, it is not 
obvious that the principle of educational equality should be wholly supplanted by the principle of 
educational adequacy.5 In the words of Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, “[j]ustice … demands 
adequacy, but it also demands equality—even if those demands must sometimes be balanced 
against each other, and against other demands it makes.”6 Second, Anderson’s and Satz’s views 
do not specify a metric of justice. That is, Anderson’s and Satz’s views do not explicitly include a 
mechanism for tracking progress towards educational adequacy. A metric of justice is important 
for setting meaningful thresholds for educational achievement and making interpersonal 
comparisons in terms of educational achievements and opportunities. 
 In this paper, I revise the principle of educational adequacy in order to address these 
problems. I argue that although the principle of educational adequacy cannot be the only principle 
in a complete theory of educational justice, it can tell us what basic justice in education requires 
in measurable terms. I do this in two parts. In the first part, I highlight two core commitments that 
Anderson and Satz share: a commitment to 1) democratic egalitarianism and 2) sufficientarian 
equal citizenship. I argue that these commitments suffice to justify three essential demands for 
basic justice in education: the comprehensive integration of the school system, the setting of 
minimum thresholds of educational achievement (commensurate with adequate opportunities for 
all), and effective access to higher education for members of disadvantaged social groups. Then, I 
 
5 For a statement of the problems with different formulations of the principle of educational equality, see Christopher 
Jencks, “Whom Must We Treat Equally for Educational Opportunity to Be Equal?” Ethics 98, no. 3 (April 1988): 
518-533. 
6 Brighouse and Swift, “Educational Equality versus Educational Adequacy,” 118. 
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reformulate these commitments in a way that appropriately accounts for the role that other 
egalitarian values have to play in a complete theory of justice in education. 
 In the second part, I address the lack of a metric of justice in Anderson’s and Satz’s views. 
I claim that progress towards educational adequacy can be measured using the capabilities 
approach—an approach to measuring social injustice and inequality in terms of what people can 
be and do.7 The capabilities approach states that basic justice requires societies to furnish every 
person with a set of basic capabilities to function in ways consistent with a good human life.8 
Conceiving of educational opportunities and achievements in terms of the capabilities necessary 
for equal citizenship makes it possible to set meaningful thresholds for basic educational 
achievement, and measure progress towards them in a concrete way. I conclude by addressing two 
potential objections and suggesting directions for future study. 
2 THE TWO CORE COMMITMENTS OF EDCUATIONAL ADEQUACY 
In this section, I examine two core commitments in Anderson’s and Satz’s views of 
educational adequacy: the commitment to 1) democratic egalitarianism, and 2) a sufficientarian 
conception of equal citizenship. I argue that these commitments suffice to yield three essential 
demands for basic justice education, and I modify them to account for other egalitarian values. 
This section is divided into three subsections. In the first subsection, I locate the commitment to 
democratic egalitarianism in Anderson’s and Satz’s views. Then, I show how the commitment 
supports essential demands for basic justice in education. Finally, I modify the commitment to 
account for other egalitarian values. In the second subsection, I repeat this procedure for the 
 
7 For an overview of the capabilities approach, see Ingrid Robeyns, "The Capability Approach," The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition). Edward N. Zalta (ed.). 
8 Not all capabilities theorists subscribe to this view. Some capabilities theorists do not propose an account of basic 
justice or specify a list of basic capabilities. For a concise discussion of this distinction in capability theory, see Martha 
C. Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach, (Cambridge:The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2011): 19. 
4 
commitment to a sufficientarian conception of equal citizenship. In the third subsection, I briefly 
discuss the role these commitments have to play in a  theory of educational justice. 
2.1 Democratic Egalitarianism 
2.1.1 Democratic Egalitarianism in Anderson’s and Satz’s Views 
 The first commitment that Anderson and Satz share is a commitment to a view of 
democratic egalitarianism. This commitment is easiest to locate in Anderson’s view, because she 
gives a comprehensive argument for an account of democratic egalitarianism in her 1999 paper, 
“What Is the Point of Equality?”9 In that account, Anderson claims democratic egalitarians assert 
two central positions, one negative and one positive. Negatively, democratic egalitarians aim to 
end oppressive social relations. For Anderson, oppressive social relations are “forms of social 
relationship by which some people dominate, exploit, marginalize, demean, and inflict violence 
on others,” often on the basis of “differences in socially ascribed identities, distinct roles in the 
division of labor, or differences in personal traits”10 Positively, democratic egalitarians aim to 
create a social order in which people can stand in relations of equality.11 This aim amounts to a 
call for “a democratic community, rather than a hierarchical one.”12 For Anderson, a democratic 
community is established and maintained through an open discussion among equals, where all are 
entitled to participation, and where everyone recognizes an obligation to listen and respond to the 
arguments of others without requiring deference of anyone.  
 Together, these two aims amount to a call for equal citizenship. In a society of equal 
citizens, all citizens stand in relations of equality, and there are no oppressive social relations. Of 
 
9 Elizabeth Anderson, “What Is the Point of Equality?” Ethics 109, no. 2 (January 1999): 287-337 
10 Anderson, “What is the Point of Equality?” 313. 
11 Ibid., 312-5.  
12 Ibid., 313. 
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course, the commitment to democratic equality is rather vague unless it is supplemented with a 
precise notion of equal citizenship. For Anderson and Satz, this notion is sufficientarian equal 
citizenship, which will be covered in the next subsection. However, the basic idea of democratic 
equality is enough to support demands for integration and minimum thresholds of educational 
achievement. It is instructive to consider how Anderson and Satz argue for these demands. 
 Anderson invokes her own notion of democratic equality to argue for the integration of the 
school system.13 Anderson’s view of educational adequacy considers the implications of a 
commitment to democratic equality for students with high levels of educational opportunity and 
achievement. She argues that in a democratic society of equal citizens, one major public good that 
flows from education is a “democratic elite,” a group of individuals who are uniquely qualified to 
hold especially demanding positions in political and civil society.14 On Anderson’s view, the 
democratic elite must be constituted in a way that protects and upholds equal democratic 
citizenship. On this basis, democratic egalitarians require “responsiveness to and effective service 
of the interests of people from all sectors of society” from the democratic elite.15 If the democratic 
elite is not responsive to the needs of all, then they fail to meet their obligation to listen and respond 
to the arguments of others in society. Moreover, if the democratic elite do not use their positions 
of power to effectively serve the interests of others,  then their power over others is unjustified, 
and the social structure resembles that of an inegalitarian hierarchy rather than a democracy.   
 A democratic elite is only capable of the responsiveness that justifies their power over 
others if they meet four qualifications as a group: “(i) an awareness of the interests and problems 
 
13 The subtitle of Anderson’s paper on this topic is “A Democratic Equality Perspective.” While she is not always 
explicit about the connections between her account of democratic equality and her account of fair opportunity in 
education, it is safe to say the latter is influenced heavily by the former.  
14 Anderson, “Fair Opportunity in Education,” 596. 
15 Ibid. 
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of people from all sectors and (ii) a disposition to serve those interests … (iii) technical knowledge 
of how to advance these interests and (iv) competence in respectful interaction with people from 
all sectors.”16 Anderson convincingly argues that qualifications (i), (ii), and (iv) are distributed 
throughout the population and cannot be obtained in an academic setting. The only way the class 
of democratic elites can meet these qualifications is if it is rigorously integrated across lines of 
race, class, and gender. Working backwards from this requirement, Anderson’s commitment to 
democratic equality entails that the K-12 school system be integrated across the same lines.17   
 Satz uses her commitment to democratic equality to argue for both the integration of the 
school system and for minimum thresholds of educational achievement. Like Anderson, Satz 
argues that “[e]ducational adequacy … is tied to the requirements of equal citizenship.18 However, 
Satz departs from Anderson by considering the implications of a commitment to democratic 
egalitarianism for people who are not likely to join the democratic elite. She relates educational 
adequacy to equal citizenship in a way that reflects both positive and negative democratic 
egalitarian aims. Satz takes up the positive aim of promoting relations of equality by arguing that 
education should foster positive egalitarian attitudes like mutual understanding, mutual respect, 
and tolerance.19 In Satz’s view, these attitudes are “group achievements, best accomplished 
through the presence of diverse individuals.”20 Thus Satz, like Anderson, calls for integrative 
measures in the K-12 school system.  
 Satz takes up the negative aim of opposing oppressive social relations by arguing that  
educational opportunity inequalities that “relegate some members of society to second-class 
 
16 Anderson, “Fair Opportunity in Education,” 596. 
17 Ibid., 597. 
18 Satz, “Equality, Adequacy, and Education for Citizenship,” 625. 
19 Ibid., 637. 
20 Ibid. 
7 
citizenship,” are unacceptable.21 Here, Satz cautions against allowing a too large a gap in real 
educational opportunities to open between groups of citizens.22 Satz reasons that if some students 
have access to significantly fewer real educational opportunities than others, such that they cannot 
plausibly reach a level of educational achievement adequate to make them capable of acting as 
equal citizens in adulthood, their status as equal citizens is directly undermined by educational 
inequalities. Inequalities of this kind are unjust because they are incompatible with democratic 
equality. As a consequence, Satz holds that there should be minimum thresholds of educational 
achievement that raise all students above second-class citizenship status.    
2.1.2 Democratic Equality and Basic Justice in Education 
 Anderson’s and Satz’ arguments use a commitment to democratic equality to support two 
demands for basic justice in education. First, the commitment to democratic egalitarianism justifies 
the integration of the school system for the purpose of creating a responsive democratic elite and 
for promoting egalitarian relations among ordinary citizens. It is important for the democratic elite 
to be qualified, because democratic societies require some people to hold positions of power, and 
those people should be qualified to do so. A segregated school system would necessarily produce 
an unqualified democratic elite, because potential members of the elite can only achieve 
competence in required skills like respectful interaction with people from all sectors of society if 
they are educated in diverse settings. A society run by an unqualified elite  is oppressive because 
it assigns hierarchical ranks according to unjust criteria. However, democratic egalitarianism does 
not justify school integration solely on the basis of its benefits for elites. Democratic egalitarianism 
requires that students learn how to treat people from all walks of life with understanding, respect, 
 
21 Satz, “Equality, Adequacy, and Education for Citizenship,” 638. 
22 Ibid.. 
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and tolerance. One of the best ways to foster these abilities in students is to educate students from 
all walks of life together.  
 Second, the commitment to democratic egalitarianism justifies a demand for a substantive 
minimum threshold of educational achievement. Democratic egalitarians oppose oppressive social 
relations. So, democratic egalitarians have reason to oppose a socially mandated course of 
schooling that fails to prepare students for equal citizenship, instead relegating them to second-
class citizenship. As it stands, this demand is rather vague, but it is useful to recognize that it is 
entailed by the democratic egalitarian view. Shortly, I will show how Anderson and Satz use the 
idea of sufficientarian equal citizenship to give it substantial content.  
2.1.3 A Value-Pluralist Formulation of the Commitment to Democratic Equality 
 These two demands—for integration and for a minimum threshold of educational 
achievement—are essential to the idea of basic educational justice. However, these demands 
should not be made to the total exclusion of other important egalitarian values. I propose a 
modified formulation of the demand that explicitly accounts for other values: 
Democratic Equality: For any educational opportunity X, X should be distributed 
in a way that is most likely to promote equal citizenship. Here, equal citizenship is 
promoted by any distributive choice that either prevents oppressive social relations 
or aids in creating a social order in which people stand in relations of equality. If 
these aims have been achieved to the extent that the conditions of basic justice 
obtain, or if there is no reasonable way to distribute X to advance these aims further, 
then the most appropriate available egalitarian principle should guide the 
distribution of X.  
 
This formulation of democratic equality supports demands for the integration of K-12 public 
schools, and for a public education that avoids relegating students to the status of second-class 
citizens. It also yields to other values under two conditions: when the conditions of basic justice 
obtain, or when democratic egalitarian aims cannot be reasonably advanced by a change in the 
9 
distribution of educational opportunities. In section 2.3, I will discuss the implications of these 
conditions at length. 
2.2 Sufficientarian Equal Citizenship 
2.2.1 Sufficientarian Equal Citizenship in Anderson’s and Satz’s Views 
 The second commitment that Anderson and Satz share is a commitment to a sufficientarian 
conception of equal citizenship.23 This commitment gives content to Anderson’s and Satz’s 
democratic egalitarian aims. In general, a conception of equal citizenship is sufficientarian if it 
holds that some person is an equal citizen with respect to others in society so long as they meet or 
exceed certain sufficiency requirements.  Satz states this commitment most concisely. In her view 
of educational adequacy, Satz defines equal citizenship in terms of three sufficiency requirements. 
Satz claims that person is an equal citizen when they “(1) have equal basic political rights and 
freedoms … ; (2) have equal rights and freedoms within civil society … ; and (3) have equal rights 
to a threshold of economic welfare.”24 This is the vision of equal citizenship included in Satz’s 
commitment to democratic egalitarianism.  
 Satz does not fully specify the content of each of these sufficiency requirements, but she 
does give some indication of what each includes. For her, basic political rights and freedoms 
include “rights to speech and participation in the political process,” civil rights and freedoms 
include “rights to own property, and to justice,” and the threshold of economic welfare must be 
high enough to allow a citizen to “share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a 
civilized being according to the standards prevailing in society.”25 That the content of these 
 
23 This is my term. However, the term is based on Anderson’s use the language of sufficiency to describe her standard 
of distribution for fair educational opportunity. See “Fair Opportunity in Education,” 614-620. 
24 Satz, “Equality, Adequacy, and Education for Citizenship,” 636.  She borrows these from the British sociologist 
T.H. Marshall. 
25 Ibid., Quoting T.H. Marshall from “share in the full” to “prevailing in society.” 
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categories is incomplete is not a problem for Satz. While some political, civil, and economic rights 
are universal, other no less necessary rights may be required to protect equal citizenship under 
conditions specific to a particular society.   
 As before, Satz focuses on the implications of a commitment to sufficientarian equal 
citizenship for the education of people unlikely to join the democratic elite. Satz holds that in 
general, “[c]itizenship requires a threshold level of knowledge and competence for exercising its 
associated rights and freedoms.”26 Importantly, Satz adds that “the empirical content of this 
threshold itself depends on the distribution of skills and knowledge in the population as a whole.”27 
For Satz, these two claims have important distributive implications. Taken together, these claims 
require the public education system to furnish all students with the basic competencies necessary 
for political and civil equality and accessing an adequate level of economic welfare. The kinds and 
degrees of competency required for meeting the threshold of basic equality in these domains are 
determined by prevailing social and material conditions. Although her focus is on ordinary 
citizens, Satz also mentions that “[c]itizens are not equal when there is a closed intergenerational 
elite,” and her “conception of adequacy … does require that everyone with the potential have 
access to the skills needed for college.”28      
 Anderson relies on a similar account of equal citizenship, which she gives in her account 
of democratic equality. In that account, Anderson claims that equal citizenship obtains when each 
citizen in a society reaches certain thresholds of capability “as a human being, as a participant in 
a system of cooperative production, and as a citizen of a democratic state.”29 The content of her 
conception of equal citizenship does not differ substantially from Satz’s. Anderson holds that “to 
 
26 Satz, “Equality, Adequacy, and Education for Citizenship,” 636. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., 638. 
29 Anderson, “What is the Point of Equality?”, 317.  
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be capable of functioning as a human being requires effective access to the means of sustaining 
one’s biological existence,” “to be capable of functioning as an equal participant in a system of 
cooperative production requires” a number of economic rights that amount to (at least) a threshold 
of economic welfare,” and “to be capable of functioning as a citizen requires rights to political 
participation … and also effective access to the goods and relationships of civil society.”30  Like 
Satz, Anderson does not fully specify these sufficiency requirements and allows that they may 
vary across time and place. However, she is committed to the fundamental idea that in all societies, 
basic justice requires each citizen to be capable of sufficient functioning as a human being, an 
equal participant in collective production, and an equal in civil and political domains. 
 Anderson sets her sufficiency standard for fair educational opportunity with an eye towards 
integrating the democratic elite. Anderson’s sufficiency standard requires that “members of all 
social groups must have effective access to a primary and secondary education sufficient to qualify 
them for success at a four-year residential college with such a curriculum.”31 Anderson defines 
effective access as “within the realistic reach of students exercising substantial but not 
extraordinary effort and within the financial reach of their families.”32 For Anderson, educational 
opportunities have been distributed in a way that protects equal citizenship so long as citizens from 
all social groups have a chance to obtain the academic qualifications needed to join the democratic 
elite. Although her focus is on elites, Anderson also briefly argues that an adequate level of 
achievement is important for everyone. Like Satz, she claims that the requirements of equal 
citizenship “set a minimum threshold of acceptable educational outcomes that varies with the 
general level of attainment in society.”33  
 
30 Anderson, “What is the Point of Equality?”, 317-8. 
31 Satz, “Equality, Adequacy, and Education for Citizenship,” 614. 
32 Ibid., 614-5. 
33 Ibid., 620. 
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2.2.2 Sufficientarian Equal Citizenship and Basic Justice in Education 
 Anderson’s and Satz’s arguments show how the commitment to sufficientarian equal 
citizenship—in conjunction with the commitment to democratic equality—justifies two important 
demands for basic justice in education. First, these commitments jointly require that every citizen 
must be furnished with a threshold level of political, civic, and economic capability. Second, these 
commitments jointly require that students from all social groups must have effective access to a 
course of education that sufficiently prepares them to enter into a program (such as a four-year 
residential college) where they can obtain the qualifications required for work in the democratic 
elite. 
 It is also worth noting that these commitments have a consequence many egalitarians 
dislike. These commitments allow that students can exceed the adequacy threshold to the extent 
that the equal citizenship of others is not under threat. In Anderson’s and Satz’s formulations of 
the principle of adequacy, this is an important allowance. Both Anderson and Satz argue that 
families with different tastes for education should be allowed to raise their children in accordance 
with those tastes.34 They also argue that the intrinsic good of education outweighs the inequalities 
that might flow from above-threshold differences in educational achievement and opportunities.35 
It is not obvious that either claim is true without qualification, and I leave the question open as to 
whether they are. A fully specified conception of justice in education will contain the principles 
 
34 See Anderson, “Fair Opportunity in Education,” 615; Satz, “Equality, Adequacy, and Education,” 634. Here, 
Anderson and Satz both have in mind guardians who bear the costs of providing above-threshold education to their 
children by, in the words of Anderson on 615, “using their own private resources or by demanding  that their public 
schools provide more.” Neither seems to have in mind families whose taste for education is below the threshold, as 
may be the case for certain religious communities like the Amish. It is not obvious to me how Anderson or Satz would 
handle this case. On my view, what counts as an adequate education for, e.g., an Amish child, would have to be 
understood in the context of the long negotiation between the Amish community and the democratic society in which 
they are situated. Families without religious objections or other potentially plausible appeals to relevant egalitarian 
values would have no choice but to educate their children at least up to the point of adequacy, regardless of their 
tastes.  
35 See Anderson, “Fair Opportunity in Education,” 615; Satz, “Equality, Adequacy, and Education,” 634. 
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necessary to guide the distribution of educational opportunities once adequacy has been achieved, 
and my formulation of democratic equality allows those principles (whatever they are) to play their 
proper role. I take no position on the principles that ought to regulate above-threshold inequalities. 
In my view, the principle of educational adequacy is best suited to justify demands for rectifying 
below-threshold levels of educational achievement.  
 However, I do find it important to acknowledge the possibility of below-threshold 
inequalities. Anderson’s and Satz’s views say little about the fact that it may be impossible for 
some students to attain all of the capabilities necessary for equal citizenship in virtue of certain 
impairments they have. In my view, while it is the general case that a democratic society is 
obligated to furnish every citizen with a threshold level of political, civic, and economic capability, 
I allow that ought implies can. Every citizen of a democratic society deserves the real opportunity 
to attain as many capabilities necessary for adequate functioning as an equal citizen in that society 
as are possible for them in a manner that respects their dignity and humanity. If a school cannot 
actually bring a student up to the desired level of capability despite using all reasonable means of 
accommodation available, then the principle of educational adequacy has not been violated.  
2.2.3 A Value-Pluralist Formulation of the Commitment to Sufficientarian Equal 
Citizenship 
 Educational adequacy is a matter of basic justice. Whatever justice requires regarding the 
distribution of education, it must condemn inadequacy. Rather than making claims about the 
regulation of above-threshold inequalities, my formulation of sufficientarian equal citizenship 
reflects this more modest position: 
Sufficientarian Equal Citizenship: A citizen C is considered an equal citizen with 
respect to others in society if C has 1) equal political rights and sufficient 
capabilities to exercise them, 2) equal civil rights and sufficient capabilities to 
exercise them, and 3) access a threshold of economic welfare that is consistent with 
14 
a) meeting basic human biological needs and b) a dignified existence as defined 
with respect to the standards of living prevalent in society. As a matter of basic 
justice, a democratic society must furnish C with all capabilities necessary for equal 
citizenship in virtue of their membership in that society. A democratic society is 
not obligated to furnish C with any capability that C cannot attain when supported 
with all appropriate accommodations that can reasonably be made available to C. 
 
In conjunction with the commitment to democratic equality, this formulation of sufficientarian 
equal citizenship supports demands for thresholds of educational achievement that correspond with 
the capabilities necessary for equal citizenship. This formulation also supports demands for 
effective access to higher education for members of disadvantaged social groups. In addition, this 
formulation uses the language of capability, which supports the metric of justice I introduce in 
section 3. For now, it is enough to think of a citizen’s capabilities as everything that they can be 
and do using the means already at their disposal. Finally, this formulation reflects my position that 
educational adequacy is a matter of basic justice. 
2.3 The Principle of Educational Adequacy and Full Educational Justice 
 In the foregoing subsections, I have provided the following reformulations of the two core 
commitments of Elizabeth Anderson’s and Debra Satz’s educational adequacy views: 
Democratic Equality: For any educational opportunity X, X should be distributed 
in a way that is most likely to promote equal citizenship. Here, equal citizenship is 
promoted by any distributive choice that either prevents oppressive social relations 
or aids in creating a social order in which people stand in relations of equality. If 
these aims have been achieved to the extent that the conditions of basic justice 
obtain, or if there is no reasonable way to distribute X to advance these aims further, 
then the most appropriate available egalitarian principle should guide the 
distribution of X.  
 
Sufficientarian Equal Citizenship: A citizen C is considered an equal citizen with 
respect to others in society if C has 1) equal political rights and sufficient 
capabilities to exercise them, 2) equal civil rights and sufficient capabilities to 
exercise them, and 3) access a threshold of economic welfare that is consistent with 
a) meeting basic human biological needs and b) a dignified existence as defined 
with respect to the standards of living prevalent in society. As a matter of basic 
justice, a democratic society must furnish C with all capabilities necessary for equal 
citizenship in virtue of their membership in that society. A democratic society is 
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not obligated to furnish C with any capability that C cannot attain when supported 
with all appropriate accommodations that can reasonably be made available to C. 
 
I have shown that these two commitments support three essential demands for basic justice in 
education: the comprehensive integration of the school system, the setting of thresholds of 
educational achievement that correspond with the capabilities necessary for equal citizenship, and 
effective access to higher education for members of disadvantaged social groups.  
 I have also modified these commitments from Anderson’s and Satz’s formulations in four 
important ways. First, I have adjusted the commitment to democratic equality to explicitly allow 
for value-pluralism. Second, I have incorporated the language of capability into the sufficientarian 
conception of equal citizenship to allow for the metric of justice I introduce in section 3. Third, I 
have changed the commitment to sufficientarian equal citizenship to reflect my claim that 
educational adequacy is a matter of basic justice. Fourth, I have acknowledged that the 
commitment to sufficientarian equal citizenship allows for below-threshold inequalities when 
citizens with impairments who are given all appropriate and reasonable accommodations cannot 
meet the adequacy threshold.  Here, I will remark briefly on the implications of the first and third 
modifications. 
 My formulation of the commitment to democratic equality allows for other values to guide 
the distribution of educational opportunities under two conditions: 1) where the conditions of basic 
justice obtain or 2) when democratic egalitarian aims cannot be reasonably advanced. The wording 
of both of these conditions is intentionally broad. Regarding the first condition, it is an open 
question what basic justice in education requires. I maintain that basic justice in education requires 
adequacy, but I allow that it may require more. Regarding the second condition, what constitutes 
a genuine barrier to the reasonable advancement of egalitarian aims is subject to debate. If either 
condition is met, it will not always be obvious what other egalitarian principle to invoke. It is 
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important for my view that what it takes to meet all of these conditions be left open to some 
interpretation. A fully specified theory of justice in education will have to grapple with complex 
situations, and my formulation of the commitment to democratic equality is flexible in recognition 
of this fact.  
 Although my formulation of the commitment to democratic equality is open to some 
interpretation, it can still provide the guidance needed to resolve important issues. For illustrative 
purposes, consider two clear cases—one involving barriers to the reasonable achievement of 
democratic egalitarian aims, and another in which basic justice obtains. First, suppose that in a 
rural community with relatively homogenous demographics, the only way to integrate the school 
system immediately would be to bus students for six hours each day to a school in the nearest 
city.36 Logistics and cost aside, this would be unreasonable. Such a policy would make it 
practically impossible for parents and their children form relationships with one another. The 
parent-child relationship is not centrally valued by democratic egalitarians, but no reasonable 
democratic egalitarian would wish to compromise it entirely. In this case, even though the principle 
of educational adequacy would require busing, the injustice that busing would do to the parents 
and children involved would obviously outweigh the injustice that busing would redress. 
Resources would be better spent on policies and practices that would bring about integration in 
that rural community in the long-run.   
 Now consider a case in which education reform has had nationwide success, and all of the 
conditions of basic justice have been met.37 All students have adequate educational opportunities, 
people who complete the publicly mandated course of schooling do not have to worry about 
 
36 This case is inspired by a similar example given in Brighouse and Swift, “Educational Equality versus Educational 
Adequacy,” 121. 
37 This case is inspired by a similar example given in Brighouse and Swift, “Educational Equality versus Educational 
Adequacy,” 125. 
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consignment to second-class citizenship, the democratic elite is both rigorously integrated and 
responsive to the needs of the worse off in society, and all other conditions of basic educational 
justice have been met. If, under these circumstances, the legislature injected substantial additional 
funding into the school system, democratic egalitarians would not be able to make precise 
recommendations about how to distribute that funding. At this point, other egalitarian principles 
would be better suited to guide the distribution of resources. For instance, with adequacy soundly 
achieved, it might be appropriate to invoke principles of educational equality to distribute a 
windfall of additional resources. Under my formulation of the commitment to democratic 
egalitarianism, this is not a problem, so long as those other principles do not skew the distribution 
of resources in a way that promotes oppressive social relations. 
 My formulation of sufficientarian equal citizenship stipulates that educational adequacy is 
a matter of basic justice. I also add that citizens are entitled to the capabilities necessary for equal 
citizenship simply in virtue of their membership in society. Educational adequacy is not something 
that citizens of a democratic society can choose to pass up—the commitment to a society of equal 
citizens is vacuous unless every citizen is furnished with all of the actual capabilities to function 
as an equal citizen that they are able to attain when appropriately accommodated.38 To be 
inadequately educated is to be incapable of full membership in a democratic society. Basic social 
justice requires that educational opportunities be distributed according to the principle of 
educational adequacy. Every citizen of such a society must  be adequately educated, except in 
 
38 It is possible and even likely that some students will refuse to learn or will forget the material they learned and thus 
lose their capabilities over time. As I will discuss in the upcoming section, my formulation of educational adequacy 
allows and sometimes requires a significant amount of paternalism to overcome student refusal to learn, especially at 
a young age. Additionally, democratic egalitarians hold that the capabilities associated with equal citizenship are 
guaranteed for life, meaning that adequacy requires people to have effective access to opportunities for continuing 
education should their capabilities atrophy below the point of adequacy. However, ought implies can, and should all 
warranted paternalism and actually accessible offers of continuing education fail to reach some students, the principle 
of educational adequacy is not violated by their choice to abstain from equal citizenship. 
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cases where capability deficits are justified by barriers to the reasonable achievement of 
democratic egalitarian aims. 
 Before moving on to a discussion of capabilities as a metric of educational adequacy, it is 
worth reflecting on the political value of this revised principle of educational adequacy. The 
principle of educational adequacy draws on democratic values to support demands for 
comprehensive integration of the school system, the setting of minimum thresholds of educational 
achievement, and effective access to higher education for members of disadvantaged social groups. 
In the contemporary U.S., the school system is plagued by residential segregation,39 failing schools 
relegate poor and racially marked students to second-class citizenship,40 and students from 
disadvantaged social groups have limited access to opportunities for higher education.41 There are 
significant legal barriers to exercising the principle of educational equality, including the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruling in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, which states that 
the constitution only guarantees students a right to an adequate education.42 The disadvantages that 
some students face, and the unfair advantages that other students have, are only reinforced by the 
activity of a closed, intergenerational, homogenous, and unresponsive elite.43  
 Under these circumstances, full educational justice seems impossibly far away—but the 
principle of educational adequacy can help us understand what needs to be done to move towards 
 
39 See, for example, Sean Reardon and Ann Owens, “60 Years After Brown: Trends and Consequences of School 
Segregation,” Annual Review of Sociology 40 (2014): 199-216.  
40 See, for example, Eric A. Hanushek, John F. Kain, and Steven G. Rivkin, "New Evidence about Brown v. Board of 
Education: The Complex Effects of School Racial Composition on Achievement," Journal of Labor Economics 27 
no. 3 (July 2009): 349-383.  
41 See, for example, Stephen B. Billings, David J Deming, Jonah Rockoff, “School Segregation, Educational  
Attainment, and Crime: Evidence from the End of Busing in Charlotte-Mecklenburg,” The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 129 no. 1 (2014): 435-476. 
42 San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
43 See, for example, Richard Reeves, Dream Hoarders: How the American Upper Middle Class Is Leaving Everyone 
Else in the Dust, Why That is a Problem, and What to Do About It, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 
2017).    
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basic justice in education. However, the principle of educational adequacy is only as useful as its 
demands are specific. The idea of sufficientarian thresholds for educational achievement is 
appealing, but unless they can be expressed in terms of measurable units, the usefulness of the 
principle of educational adequacy remains limited. The principle of educational adequacy requires 
a metric of justice to make politically substantive demands.   
3 EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY AND THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 
 In this section, I claim that progress towards educational adequacy can be measured using 
the capabilities approach—an approach to measuring social injustice and inequality in terms of 
what people can be and do. Capability theorists hold that basic justice requires societies to furnish 
every person with a set of basic capabilities to function in ways consistent with a good human 
life.44 If we conceive of educational opportunities and outcomes in terms of the capabilities 
necessary for equal citizenship, then we can set meaningful thresholds for basic educational 
achievement, and measure progress towards them in a concrete way. This section is divided into 
two subsections. In the first subsection, I provide background on the capabilities approach. In the 
second subsection,  I describe how the capabilities approach can work as a metric of justice for 
educational adequacy. 
3.1 The Capabilities Approach 
 The capabilities approach is “an approach to quality-of-life assessment and to theorizing 
about basic social justice. It holds that the question to ask, when comparing societies and assessing 
them for basic decency or justice, is “What is each person able to do and be?””45 The approach 
was initially developed by the economist and philosopher Amartya Sen as an alternative measure 
 
44 Not all capabilities theorists endorse this view. See footnote 8 for details. 
45 Martha Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 19. 
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for quality-of-life in developing economies.46 However, the approach has since been generalized 
by Sen, Martha Nussbaum, and others, such that it can be used to measure inequality and test for 
basic justice in a wide variety of contexts.  
 The capabilities approach includes a way to measure people’s freedom to achieve well-
being, where this freedom is conceived of in terms of what people are actually able to be and do.47 
The capabilities approach measures people’s freedom to achieve well-being in terms of their 
functionings and capabilities.48 Sen succinctly defines functionings as a person’s “beings and 
doings.”49 Put more explicitly, a person’s functionings consist of all of the states of being that 
person achieves, and all of the things that person does. The term is intentionally broad, so that it 
can capture the diverse ways in which people can realize (or fail to realize) their well-being. Some 
examples of basic functionings include eating nutritious food, appearing in public without shame, 
reading materials written in one’s native language, being a tolerated and accepted in one’s 
community, and living in a safe home.  
 Capabilities are all of the functionings a person can actually achieve given their life 
circumstances. A person’s capability set consists of all of the real opportunities that person has to 
be and do different things.50 As a consequence, a person’s capability set is inclusive of and nearly 
always larger than the set of all of the functionings they achieve. This is just to say that people can 
be and do more than they in fact achieve. Capabilities theorists conceive of freedom in terms of 
capabilities, because adults are free to refrain from exercising their capabilities to function. To 
borrow an example from Sen, a starving person and a fasting person are both deficient in the same 
 
46 For a rigorous statement of Sen’s approach to development economics, see Amartya Sen, Development as 
Freedom, (New York: Anchor Books, 1999). 
47 Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined, (New York: Sage Press, 1992): 39-55. 
48 Ibid., 39-40. 
49 Ibid., 39. 
50 Ibid., 39-40. 
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functioning.51 Both are not eating. However, a fasting person is perfectly capable of eating, and 
only refrains on principle. A starving person is not eating because they are not capable—they do 
not have any real opportunities to eat. The capabilities approach would say that the starving person 
has less freedom to achieve well-being than the fasting person, even if they are both equally 
hungry. The fasting person has the real opportunity to eat, while the starving person does not. On 
the capabilities view, the starving person does not have the freedom to fast.  
 The capabilities approach gives a rich account of human freedom, but it is only a partial 
approach to theorizing about social justice.52 One consequence of this is that the capabilities 
approach does not fully specify which capabilities societies have an obligation to equalize. 
However, some capability theorists maintain that there exists a set of basic capabilities that 
societies ought to equalize as a matter of basic justice.53 Elizabeth Anderson’s account of 
democratic equality can be understood as one view of what those capabilities are. Since the revised 
principle of educational adequacy takes on a commitment to democratic equality based on 
Anderson’s, it is apt to measure progress towards educational adequacy in terms of capabilities.     
3.2 Capabilities as a Metric of Justice for Educational Adequacy 
 The revised principle of educational adequacy sets thresholds for educational achievement 
according to the requirements of democratic equality and sufficientarian equal citizenship. I argue  
that these thresholds can be helpfully expressed in terms of capabilities. For example, 
sufficientarian equal citizenship requires that as a matter of basic justice, all citizens of a 
democratic society must have equal political rights and sufficient capabilities to exercise them. 
 
51 Sen, Inequality Reexamined, 52. 
52 Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, (Cambridge: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2006): 75. 
53 Martha Nussbaum is the primary proponent of this view, and the previously cited books Creating Capabilities and 
Frontiers of Justice both contain comprehensive statements of her view. Elizabeth Anderson’s “What Is the Point of 
Equality?” rests on the same basic assumption, although her view is distinct in content from Nussbaum’s.  
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The commitment to democratic equality states that a citizen is insufficiently capable of exercising 
their political rights if they cannot avoid oppressive social relations or cannot relate to others as an 
equal. Under the guidance of these commitments, it is possible to specify a list of capabilities that 
are necessary to exercise one’s political rights. Such a list might include capabilities like being 
able to cast an informed vote, being able to communicate intelligibly in public forums, being able 
to serve on a jury, being equipped with an understanding of how the government works, or being 
able to understand and critically interpret the arguments of candidates for political offices.  
 Each of these capabilities require other capabilities, some of which are universal, and some 
of which may be specific to particular social arrangements or individual conditions. For example, 
being able to communicate intelligibly in public forums universally requires competence in a 
publicly recognized language. However, other requirements for intelligible public communication 
vary—important public discourse may take place in physical places, in written publications, or on 
the internet. In some societies, a citizen may be sufficiently capable of intelligible public 
communication when they are competent oral communicators in one language, while citizens in 
other societies citizens may have to be competent in multiple languages, written language, or the 
use of computers to achieve sufficiency. A fully specified list of the capabilities necessary for 
equal citizenship will include all of the capabilities necessary for exercising political and civil 
rights, and for achieving a threshold level of economic welfare, as specified in the commitment to 
sufficientarian equal citizenship.          
 The resulting list will include a set of capabilities necessary for basic justice in education.54  
 
54 This list may also include capabilities that no amount of education can grant students because of broader political, 
civil, or economic injustices. For example, if labor market discrimination excludes people with disabilities from work, 
education alone may not be able to ensure that people with disabilities are capable of securing basic economic welfare. 
Basic justice in education cannot resolve such discrimination, and educators are not obliged to do the impossible. In 
such cases, educators are responsible for treating such students with equal dignity and getting them as close to the 
relevant adequacy threshold(s) as possible.  
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Recall that basic justice only requires that citizens achieve these capabilities up to a threshold level 
set relative to the distribution of capabilities in society. This threshold must be set high enough 
that every citizen who meets it is capable of avoiding oppressive social relations and relating to 
others as an equal, but the principle of educational adequacy by itself gives no reasons for setting 
the threshold any higher. Furthermore, basic justice in education does not require that each and 
every citizen be furnished with a threshold level of these capabilities at all costs. In any case where 
there are barriers to reasonably advancing democratic egalitarian aims, other values may justify 
allowing below-threshold levels of achievement. In such cases, resources may be better spent on 
long-term solutions that would eliminate such barriers. 
 Expressing adequacy thresholds for educational achievement in terms of capabilities has 
several advantages. One advantage is that it gives content to the ideas of educational achievement 
and educational opportunity. On this view, a student’s educational achievements are measured in 
terms of the functionings they have demonstrated. Basic justice in education requires that each 
student demonstrate that they are capable of functioning in all of the ways that the principle of 
educational adequacy requires. Following the same line of reasoning, educational opportunities 
are opportunities for students to achieve new functionings. On the capabilities approach, an 
opportunity is understood to be a real chance to do something—if a person cannot do something 
using the means already at their disposal, they do not have the opportunity to do it. So, on this 
view, an educational opportunity is a chance for a student to achieve a new functioning using 
means already at their disposal.55 
 
55 Anderson uses this language to describe her concept of “effective access” in “What Is the Point of Equality,” 318. 
Other capability theorists use the language of “real opportunity” to mean the same thing. See, for example, Nussbaum, 
Creating Capabilities, 18. 
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 These understandings of educational opportunity and achievement come with two further 
advantages. First, if an educational opportunity is a chance to achieve a new functioning using 
means already at one’s disposal, then a significant amount of paternalism is permitted in providing 
students with educational opportunities.56 For example, this conception of educational opportunity 
would say that leaving a young child alone in a room full of books is not equivalent to giving that 
child an opportunity to learn how to read. Giving a young child an opportunity to read requires 
setting realistic targets for that child, and then ensuring that the child has the means to reach those 
targets—like teaching them how to recognize letters and sound out words, and eventually asking 
them to read small fragments of text out loud independently. On this conception of educational 
opportunity, there is no sense in which young children can waste their opportunities to achieve 
basic capabilities, because it is the responsibility of teachers to ensure that young children have 
the means to achieve the functionings associate with those capabilities. Importantly, such high 
levels of paternalism would not be warranted for older students. Insofar as older students are 
capable of independent learning and self-motivation, the educational opportunities presented to 
them ought to reflect the more advanced means to demonstrate new functionings that they have at 
their disposal.  
 Second, since educational achievements are understood to be demonstrated functionings, 
they can be measured in concrete terms. Tests of adequate educational achievement simply need 
to measure students’ abilities to demonstrate a level of functioning consistent with a threshold level 
of the capabilities associated with equal citizenship. This is perhaps the most important implication 
of adopting capabilities as a metric of justice for educational adequacy. If the principle of 
 
56 In “Equality, Adequacy, and Education,” Satz raises the concern that “the language … of “opportunity” seems 
misplaced in primary and at least part of secondary school education … we expect students to go o school and master 
certain capabilities; it is not enough that they have the opportunities to do so” (631). I write with this concern in mind.  
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educational adequacy can be used to generate a list of capability thresholds that students must meet 
as a matter of basic justice, and progress towards those thresholds can be measured in terms of 
functionings, then the principle of educational adequacy can be used to make highly specific 
political demands. Although such demands will be for basic—rather than complete—educational 
justice, basic educational justice in an urgent need in the U.S. and around the world. 
 For example, in the U.S., the principle of adequacy could be used to justify policy 
interventions that reduce the unjust advantages that flow to students who are educated in elite 
private schools. These policies would narrow the achievement gap between elite private school 
students and public school students, which arguably relegates students in the lowest-performing 
public schools to second-class citizenship. The exact content of such policy interventions would 
be better determined by policy experts, but a system of private school vouchers granted to multiply-
disadvantaged students would not be out of the question. There is a growing body of empirical 
evidence that suggests that when disadvantaged students are granted vouchers that cover some or 
all of the costs of attending high-performing private schools, their academic and long-term 
outcomes improve.57 Such policies also have the potential to increase the diversity of private 
schools, reduce educational opportunity hoarding on the part of the elite, and eventually contribute 
to the integration of the elite. Of course, like all policies, targeted private school vouchers are not 
without trade-offs and downsides. Still, they are a good example of the sort of intervention that the 
principle of educational adequacy may serve to justify.   
 It is beyond the scope of my argument to provide a complete list of all of the demands, 
changes, and policies that the principle of educational adequacy could support. However, as the 
above example shows, the principle of educational adequacy can be used to make specific demands 
 
57 For a comprehensive review of the empirical literature on these policies, see Dennis Epple et. al., “School Vouchers: 
A Survey of the Economics Literature,” Journal of Economic Literature 55, no. 2 (2017): 441-493. 
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for basic justice in education, and those demands can be met with the help of pragmatic, 
empirically-supported policies. The capabilities metric gives social scientists and policymakers a 
way to measure the success of such policies—in terms of the change in students’ ability to 
demonstrate functionings associated with the capabilities essential for equal citizenship.     
4 OBJECTIONS 
 In this paper, I have argued that although the principle of educational adequacy cannot be 
the only principle in a complete theory of educational justice, it can tell us what basic justice in 
education requires in measurable terms. First, I argued Elizabeth Anderson’s and Debra Satz’s 
arguments for educational adequacy make two core commitments: a commitment to 1) democratic 
egalitarianism, and 2) sufficientarian equal citizenship. I showed that these two commitments 
suffice to justify three essential demands for basic justice in education: the comprehensive 
integration of the school system, the setting of minimum thresholds of educational achievement, 
and effective access to higher education for members of disadvantaged social groups. Then, I 
reformulated these commitments to properly account for the role other values have to play in a 
complete theory of educational justice. The resulting revised principle of educational adequacy 
specifies what basic justice in education requires, but it does not regulate the distribution of 
educational opportunities once the conditions of basic justice obtain. Second, I claim that the 
sufficiency thresholds set by the revised principle of educational adequacy should be understood 
in terms of capabilities. When sufficiency thresholds are understood in this way, progress towards 
educational adequacy can be measured in concrete terms.  
 Compared to Anderson’s and Satz’s adequacy views, my view is rather modest. I claim 
that the principle of educational adequacy can give us a partial picture of what educational justice 
requires, and I argue that those requirements can be understood in terms of capabilities. In making 
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this modest claim, I hope to account more carefully for the other values and principles that ought 
to play a role in a complete theory of justice in education. However, this compromise invites at 
least two objections. It could be argued that the primary obligation the principle of educational 
adequacy entails—i.e., the obligation to furnish all students with a threshold level of capabilities 
necessary for equal citizenship—is either too strong or too weak. 
 First, one could object that the obligation to furnish all students with basic capabilities is 
too strong. One way the obligation could be too strong is if it requires too many resources to be 
spent on bringing students with low levels of capability up to the adequacy thresholds. Consider, 
for instance, the case of a student with severe learning disabilities, an unsupportive family, and 
serious behavioral issues. It seems that it would be unreasonably costly to attempt to bring such a 
student up to the requisite capability thresholds, and that such attempts might nonetheless fall short 
in view of the limits imposed by the student’s impairments and family situation. In such a case, 
the principle of educational adequacy only requires that this student be supported with all 
reasonable and appropriate accommodations in order to bring them as close to the threshold as 
possible. What counts as ‘reasonable’ will depend on the resources at the disposal of the school 
where that student is being educated. The principle of adequacy does not require the impossible of 
schools or educators—it just requires their best efforts.      
 Another way the obligation to furnish students with basic capabilities could be too strong 
is if it would entail limiting the educational opportunities of high-aptitude students.  If basic justice 
in education requires reducing the achievement gap such that no student is relegated to second-
class citizenship, it may seem necessary to “level down” high-achieving students.58 My 
formulation of the principle of educational adequacy does not require levelling down. On my view, 
 
58 Anderson and Satz both oppose levelling down. See Satz, “Equality, Adequacy, and Education,” 648, and Anderson 
“Fair Opportunity in Education,” 615.  
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basic justice in education is consistent with inequalities in educational achievement that are 
justifiable according to democratic egalitarian principles. On these grounds, the principle of 
educational adequacy requires integrating the school system and granting effective access to higher 
education to members of disadvantaged social groups so that unequal levels of achievement are 
likely to rebound to the benefit of the worse off. Levelling down would run contrary to these 
purposes. It is an open question whether a fully specified theory of justice in education would 
require levelling down, but the principle of educational adequacy does not in itself justify levelling 
down.    
 The second kind of objection one could raise against my view is that the obligation to 
furnish all students with basic capabilities is too weak. One case in which this obligation could be 
too weak is if a student with disabilities is able to meet thresholds despite her impairments. Anita 
Silvers and Michael Stein raise the case of the student Amy Rowley.59 Rowley is deaf, but she can 
lip-read, and with the help of a hearing aid and some assistance in class, she was able to achieve 
above average performance in school. However, she missed much of the material communicated 
during instruction, and she would have been able to achieve at a higher level if she had a sign-
language interpreter in class. It seems like the principle of educational adequacy would say that 
basic justice has been achieved in Rowley’s case, even though she was capable of higher 
performance.  
 However, the commitment to democratic equality does entitle Rowley to a sign-language 
interpreter (or equivalent). Recall that the positive aim of democratic egalitarians is to create a 
society in which people can stand in relations of equality. This aim calls for a democratic 
community that is established and maintained through an open discussion among equals, where all 
 
59 Anita Silvers and Michael A. Stein, ‘Disability and the Social Contract,’ University of Chicago Law Review 74 
(2007): 1651-3. 
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are entitled to participation, and where everyone recognizes an obligation to listen and respond to 
the arguments of others without requiring deference of anyone. Although the commitment to 
democratic egalitarianism requires specific thresholds of capability for justice in education, it also 
has more wide-ranging implications for how people ought to be treated while they are in school. 
The idea of civic equality is internal to the principle of educational adequacy, and civic equality 
obliges schools to accommodate people like Amy Rowley such that they can listen and 
communicate as equals.   
 Another way this obligation could be too weak is if it allowed schools to divert all new 
resources to high-aptitude students once everyone is at- or above-threshold. The principle of 
educational adequacy does not specify how to distribute educational opportunities once thresholds 
have been met, and therefore it does not exclude this possibility when standing alone. However, I 
hold that whenever conditions of basic justice obtain, other principles should guide the distribution 
of educational opportunities. Basic justice is just that—basic. It should not be surprising that the 
principle of educational adequacy does not make recommendations that are fully just. However, 
following the recommendations of the principle of educational adequacy when basic justice does 
not obtain will lead to greater justice in education.  
5 CONCLUSION 
 I have made the case that the principle of educational adequacy can be used to concretize 
many important requirements of basic educational justice. This is an important first step in 
understanding the role that the principle of educational adequacy has to play in a fully specified 
conception of educational justice, but much more work remains to be done. I conclude by 
suggesting two possible directions for future study. First, while I claim that the principle of 
educational adequacy has an essential role to play in determining the requirements of basic justice 
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in education, it is not obvious that it is the only principle that should be involved. More work needs 
to be done to determine what basic justice in education entails. A full conception of basic justice 
in education would be of significant value to the project of developing a complete theory of 
educational justice. Second, more work needs to be done to determine what other values it would 
be unreasonable for democratic egalitarians to compromise in the pursuit of educational adequacy. 
It is clear that there are cases in which this happens, and I allow that it can, but a more systematic 
approach would do much to clarify what adequacy entails. Although there is more work to be done, 
the project of understanding the principle of educational adequacy is worth pursuing. Whatever 
justice in education requires, it condemn inadequacy. 
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